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Abstract We compare patent litigation cases across four European jurisdictions—
Germany, the UK (England and Wales), France, The Netherlands—using case-level
data gathered from cases filed in the four jurisdictions during the period 2000–2008.
Overall, we find substantial differences across jurisdictions in terms of caseloads—
notably, courts in Germany hear by far the largest number of cases, not only in
absolute terms, but also when taking macro-economic indicators into account—and
we further find important cross-country variances in terms of case outcomes.
Moreover, we show empirically that a considerable number of patents are litigated
across multiple European jurisdictions; and further, that in the majority of these
cases divergent case outcomes are reached across the different jurisdictions, sug-
gesting that the long-suspected problem of inconsistency of decision-making in
European patent litigation is in fact real. Finally, we note that the coming into force
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of the Unified Patent Court in Europe may, in the long term, help to alleviate this
inconsistency problem.
Keywords Patent litigation  Europe  Patent system  Enforcement 
Unified patent court
JEL Classification O34  K11  K41
1 Introduction
At present, the European patent system is undergoing a series of major reforms with
the aim of ‘‘unifying’’ (or rather ‘‘defragmenting’’) the patent litigation system. It
currently operates on a national basis, rather than a trans-national one, with national
courts possessing the right to adjudicate patent disputes within their territories.***1
The current fragmented system is often criticized for creating unnecessary costs and
complexities for patent litigants (Harhoff 2009).
The new EU-led reforms will create a European Patent with Unitary effect (EPU,
also known as the unitary patent) in all member states of the European Union that
have adopted the reform package, as well as a Unified Patent Court (UPC), which
will be competent to issue judgments with unitary effect across all participating
jurisdictions.2 By locating court venues across the participating EU member
states—including a range of local, regional and central divisions—the UPC aims to
strike a balance between the legal certainty provided by the centralization of the
adjudication of patent disputes across Europe and the benefits of local adjudication
of patent disputes.3
1 Text of the European Patent Convention, of 5 October 1973, as revised by the Act revising Article 63
EPC of 17 December 1991, and the Act revising the EPC of 29 November 2000.
2 Spain, Poland and Croatia are currently the only EU member countries not participating in the Unified
Patent Court, which thus covers 25 out of 28 EU member states. At present, Spain and Croatia are the
only EU member states that have not signed up to the European patent with unitary effect, or unitary
patent (since Italy has dropped its opposition and joined up). See Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the
area of the creation of unitary patent protection; Council regulation (EU) No. 1260/2012 of 17 December
2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of Unitary patent protection with
regard to the applicable translation arrangements—both documents accessible at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/indprop/patent/documents/index_en.htm. See also Agreement on a Unified Patent Court
2013/C 175/01 (http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri = OJ:C:2013:175:0001:0040:
EN:PDF). For a further explanation of the changes see the European Patent Office (EPO) website—http://
www.epo.org/law-practice/unitary.html.
3 The UPC consists of a Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal. The Court of First Instance
comprises a Central division and several local and regional divisions. The central division has its seat in
Paris with specialized sections in London (chemical and pharmaceutical patents) and Munich (mechanical
engineering). The Court of Appeal has its seat in Luxembourg.
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Over the past few years, policy makers, academics and practitioners have debated
the merits of the patent reform package, and the UPC in particular. One recurring
point of discussion has been the fact that although the UPC is in some respects a
unified patent litigation system—with infringement and validity issues potentially
decided simultaneously by the same court—it nevertheless allows for bifurcation to
occur in some circumstances, an unusual situation that reflects the influence of the
German patent litigation system, as explored below.4
Other major concerns commentators have with the reforms center on the
questions of (i) whether the package will actually reduce the fragmentation and
complexity inherent in the current European patent system (in light of the fact that
not all EU member states are participating in the UPC, and that national courts will
share jurisdiction with the UPC for a transitional period of at least 7 years) and (ii)
whether the reforms will actually lower the costs for judicial proceedings in
practice—thereby creating greater access to patent enforcement services, especially
for small and medium size enterprises (SMEs)—without creating incentives for
welfare-reducing litigation activities. Even now, with the new system due to come
into being in 2016 or 2017 these questions remain largely unresolved, due to the
complexities surrounding choice of litigation venue during the transition period—
which is to be taken by claimants—as well as concerns over the costs of proceedings
and possible ‘‘forum-shopping’’ by patent litigants, including so-called Non-
practicing entities (NPEs) or ‘‘patent trolls’’.5
One key point that we seek to make at the outset is that over the past few years the
debate about reforming the European patent litigation system has been characterized
by extensive and frequent use of (often controversial) anecdotal evidence. Indeed,
the debate has been undercut by a lack of analytical insights derived from actual
empirical data analysis—a deficiency that is explained by the fact that systematic and
comparable data concerning patent litigation in Europe has not been available to
researchers (a situation which stands in stark contrast to the US, where extensive
empirical evidence on patent litigation exists and is accessible to researchers).
As a result, there has been no evidence-based statistical evaluation of the need for
specific litigation reforms in Europe, or of the likely impact of such reforms on
litigation outcomes. For example, an important argument put forward by the
proponents of the UPC is that the existence of the new court will cut down on the
duplication of court cases across different European jurisdictions; and in doing so,
4 The validity of a patent may be challenged before the Central division or a local/regional division,
whereas infringement claims will be filed at local/regional divisions (unless the defendant is not an EU
resident). In the case of a counterclaim for invalidity filed during infringement proceedings before a local/
regional division, the local/regional division has discretion to refer the validity challenge to the Central
division. The fact that invalidity claims can only be filed at the Federal Patent Court after an opposition at
the German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) or the EPO (or after the period for an opposition has
expired) may further delay the decision on validity.
5 The UPC Rules of Procedure were finalized in October 2015 see http://www.unified-patent-court.org/
images/documents/UPC-Rules-of-Procedure.pdf (last visited 05 Nov 2015). For analysis of the challenges
of the new system, including the issues of forum-shopping and ‘‘patent troll litigation’’ see L. McDonagh,
’Exploring perspectives of the Unified Patent Court and the Unitary Patent within the Business and Legal
Communities’ A Report Commissioned by the UK Intellectual Property Office (July 2014); https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/exploring-perspectives-of-the-up-and-upc (last visited 05 Nov 2015).
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will reduce the uncertainty created by the existence of different outcomes on
essentially the same case (and same patent) in different jurisdictions. However,
given the lack of comprehensive statistics on cross-border patent litigation, how can
the merits of this argument be assessed?
In this article, we present evidence based on a newly gathered dataset of empirical
patent case data—a comprehensive dataset which enables us to undertake a direct
comparison between patent litigation in the four major patent litigation systems in
Europe: Germany, the UK (England and Wales),6 France, and The Netherlands for
the period 2000–2008.7 Importantly, our study differs from, and improves upon, the
existing available data and literature, which generally is based on much more limited
data samples than we provide in this article.8 Moreover, the present article is the first
one in Europe to offer a view of the parties involved in patent litigation (litigant-level
analysis), something which greatly enriches our study.
In undertaking our analysis, we note that there are important differences in the
legal systems in these four jurisdictions, something that makes any comparison a
challenging task. The most obvious difference between these four systems is that the
German patent litigation system is bifurcated, i.e., infringement and validity are
handled separately at different courts. The other three legal systems combine
adjudication of both validity and infringement within the same court action. Since
the UPC allows for bifurcation, the comparison undertaken in this article, between
the bifurcated litigation system in Germany and the litigation systems in the other
jurisdictions which do not feature bifurcation, provides useful insights with regard
to some of the benefits expected from introducing the UPC.
In order to undertake our analysis, we collected case-level patent litigation data
directly from court records and a range of other sources in all four jurisdictions for
the period 2000–2008. We collected the data in a harmonized way in order to ensure
comparability—a major challenge given the variances in legal procedures across the
four jurisdictions. The results we provide in this article point to a number of
6 The UK contains the legal systems of England & Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Our data solely
refer to the UK’s major patent jurisdiction of England and Wales (also known as Britain), where the vast
majority of UK patent litigation is undertaken. For the purposes of simplicity and to enable a direct
country-comparison with the other jurisdictions of Germany, France and the Netherlands, we refer to the
jurisdiction of England & Wales as the UK throughout this paper.
7 The objective of this study is to cover all patent cases filed at the courts covered by our investigation
during the period 2000–2008. These cases may have been decided after 2008; since our data collection
occurred between 2010 and 2012, decisions made after 2008 for cases filed 2000–2008 are covered within
our dataset. However, in its current form, the data we possess for the Netherlands and France do not cover
all cases filed, but are largely restricted to cases that were adjudicated.
8 For example, Harhoff (2009) relies mostly on practitioner estimates and estimates drawn from already
existing literature. Our dataset is much broader than this. The paper closest to ours is a recent study by
Graham and van Zeebroeck (GVZ) (2014). Their empirical analysis covers seven countries, including the
four considered in our present article. Our data collection and analysis can be differentiated from the GVZ
paper in several ways: first, our data for Germany and the UK is derived from direct case records,
available from paper records or online, whereas GVZ rely on a database produced by an IP analysis
company (GVZ’s data cover only about 50 % of the German cases and the GVZ article lacks data on
settlements); second, whereas GVZ’s analysis is performed at the judgment level (i.e., court decisions, or
adjudications), our study is based on data aggregated at the case level; this article offers an important
cross-check on the accuracy of the results reported in GVZ.
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differences in litigation patterns and outcomes across the four jurisdictions, some of
which challenge conventional wisdom regarding patent litigation in Europe.
In this article, for the first time, we provide accurate, comparative case-level data
and litigant-level data for the four major patent jurisdictions of Europe—Germany,
the UK, France and The Netherlands. Overall, for the period 2000–2008 we find
substantial differences across jurisdictions in terms of caseloads—notably, courts in
Germany hear by far the largest number of cases, not only in absolute terms, but
also when taking macro-economic indicators into account—and we further find
important cross-country variances in terms of case outcomes. Moreover, we show
empirically that a considerable number of patents are litigated across multiple
European jurisdictions; and further, that in the majority of these cases divergent case
outcomes are reached across the different jurisdictions, suggesting that the long-
suspected problem of inconsistency of decision-making in European patent
litigation is in fact real. Finally, we note that the coming into force of the UPC
in Europe may, in the long term, help to alleviate this inconsistency problem.
Following this introductory section, the remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: Sect. 2 discusses relevant differences in the four legal systems; Sect. 3
describes the collection of our litigation data and the construction of the dataset used
in our analysis; Sect. 4 contains our comparison of litigation across European
jurisdictions; and finally, Sect. 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Enforcement systems
This section explains briefly the main characteristics of the four enforcement
systems and highlights some of the substantive and procedural differences that exist
between the jurisdictions of Germany, the UK, France and The Netherlands.
2.1 Germany
The German patent system is illustrated in Fig. 1.
In Germany twelve regional courts, Landgerichte (LGs), are competent to hear
patent and utility model infringement cases.9 Appeals against the decisions of the
LGs are heard by the higher regional courts (Oberlandesgericht—OLG). Against
the decisions of the higher regional courts, a second appeal can be brought before
the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof—BGH).
The LGs have no jurisdiction to decide on the validity of a patent—neither in
form of a defense against a patentee’s claims for patent infringement nor in form of
a (counter-) claim for declaratory judgment of invalidity. This is referred to as
bifurcation of infringement and validity proceedings.10 In both patent and utility
9 Berlin, Braunschweig, Du¨sseldorf, Erfurt, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Magdeburg, Mannheim,
Munich I, Nuremberg-Fu¨rth and Saarbru¨cken. See § 143 PatG and § 27 GebrMG and the relevant
regulations of the respective federal states.
10 The situation is different for infringement suits on the basis of utility models in which the defendant is
allowed to raise an invalidity defense. See BGH, Opinion dated June 5, 1997—X ZR 139/95, BGHZ 136,
40, 42—Leiterplattennutzen (English translation not available).
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model infringement proceedings the infringement court has the discretion to stay the
proceedings until parallel revocation proceedings before EPO, DPMA (Deutsches
Patent- und Markenamt) and BPatG (Bundespatentgericht) have come to a
conclusion.11
As in all contracting states of the EPC, the validity of an EP can be challenged by
filing an opposition before the EPO. The validity of a DE patent may be challenged
by filing an opposition before the DPMA.12 The decisions of the DPMA can then be
appealed before the Federal Patent Court.13 Only after the deadline for filing an
opposition against a DE patent or EP have lapsed and all pending opposition and
appeal proceedings against the patent have been terminated, can a revocation action
against an EP and DE patent be filed before the BPatG.14 The decisions of the
BPatG can be appealed before the BGH. Therefore, the BGH is the only court in
Germany which has jurisdiction to decide on both infringement and validity.
stay
request
1st Instance Infringement
Regional Court (Landgericht)
No jurisdicon for Invalidity!
Stay if invalidity "very likely";
No disclosure, normally no experts
Proceedings available to Patentee Proceedings available to Alleged Infringer
Interim Proceedings
Regional Court (Landgericht)
(e.g. prelim. injuncon; search &
seizure of evidence)
Opposion
EPO / DPMA
Appeal
EPO / BPatG
1st Appeal Infringement
Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)
Stay if invalidity "likely"
2nd Appeal Infringement & 1st Appeal Validity
Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof)
Infringement & validity proceedings usually joined and heard together
Enforcement Proceedings
Judgments provisionally enforceable
against security
1st Instance re Amount of Damages
Regional Court (Landgericht)
Revocaon
Federal Patent Court
(Bundespatentgericht)
Only aer opposion
Cost Proceedings
Costs shied on basis of calculaon
depending on "value in dispute"
Fig. 1 Overview of the patent litigation system in Germany
11 See § 148 ZPO.
12 See §§ 21 and 59 PatG seq.
13 See § 73 PatG seq.
14 See §§ 65, 81 PatG seq. and Art. II § 2 IntPatU¨G.
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2.2 UK (England and Wales)
In the context of our data collection period—2000–2008—the patent litigation
system in the UK is illustrated in Fig. 2. With respect to cases filed 2000–2008 there
are two UK courts of relevance to our analysis, both of which are located in England
and Wales: (i) the Patents County Court (PCC)—since 2013 reconstituted as the
Intellectual Property Enterprise Court (IPEC)—which deals with low-value claims,
and (ii) the Patents Court (PHC), which is a specialist court of the Chancery
Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales.15 In principle, the PCC
(now the IPEC) hears patent cases of lower value and complexity. In practice, the
overwhelming majority of patent cases during the period 2000–2008 were heard by
the PHC.16
Appeals are made from the PHC to the Court of Appeal (CA). Leave to appeal
must be granted by the PHC or by the CA itself. The decision of the CA can be
1st Instance Infringement & Validity
Patents Court of High Court (PHC) OR Patents County Court (PCC)
Stay possible but rare; disclosure; experts involved and cross-examined
Invalidity may be raised as:
Proceedings available to Patentee
stay
request
Proceedings available to Alleged Infringer
Interim Proceedings
PHC or PCC
(e.g. prelim. injuncon; search &
seizure of evidence)
Opposion
EPO
Appeal
EPO
1st Appeal Infringement & Validity
Court of Appeal
2nd Appeal Infringement & Validity
Supreme Court
Enforcement Proceedings
Judgments/Orders enforceable
without security (“Contempt of Court”)
1st Instance re Amount of Damages
Patents Court (PHC)
Defense Separate AconCounterclaim
Cost Proceedings
Full costs can be shied
Fig. 2 Overview of the patent litigation system in England and Wales
15 Over the course of this article we refer to the PCC because this was the constitution of the court for the
period of our data collection.
16 See Helmers and McDonagh (2013a), Tables 1 and 5. Helmers et al. (2015) show that the 2010–2013
reforms to the PCC, now the IPEC, mean that patent litigation is now more common at the venue.
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challenged at the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords). Once again, leave
must be given for appeal to the Supreme Court (SC), either by the CA or the SC
itself.17
As noted above, the validity of an EP can be challenged by filing an opposition
before the EPO. In addition, the UK Intellectual Property Office (UK IPO) has a
procedure to revoke UK national patents (GBs), e.g., via its patent opinion service.18
In the UK there is a combined system of filing infringement and revocation
claims at the same court. This means that the PCC (now, the IPEC) and the PHC
have jurisdiction to determine both infringement and the validity of a UK national
patent (GB) or the UK-validated part of a European patent (EP).
The jurisdiction of the PCC and PHC to determine patent validity is independent
of the question of whether the deadlines for opposition against an EP have or have
not lapsed and/or whether opposition proceedings are pending. However, the courts
can stay the proceedings until the EPO has decided about an opposition. In the past,
the PHC only rarely granted a stay pending EPO proceedings, but a recent decision
of the UK Supreme Court has led to a partial revision of this policy.19
Table 1 Comparison of patent litigation systems
Features DE FR NL UK
First instance courts 12 (?1 for
validity)
1 (10 before
‘09)
1 2
Appeals court 1/1 (?1 for
validity)
1/1 1/1 1/1
Separation of infringement and
validity
Yes No No No
Preliminary injunctions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cross-border enforcement No No Yes No
Average cost range (in
thousand EUR)
80–200 50–200 60–200 2000–4000
Fee shifting Partly Partly Full (barely before
‘07)
Full (issue-
based)
Utility models Yes No No No
A recent UK decision—Actavis Group HF v Eli Lilly & Co [2012] EWHC 3316 (Pat)—has allowed for
very limited cross-border enforcement of patents, but this was largely not applicable to cases decided
during our case filing period 2000–2008
In France there is something called a Certificate of Utility but it is not identical to a Utility Model. http://
www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/utility_models/where.htm. Last visited 05 Nov 2005
17 According to the Judicial and Court Statistics 2008, the number of IP related cases heard by the House
of Lords/Supreme Court is typically negligible—there were none in 2006, there was only 1 out of 45 total
cases heard in 2007, and only 1 out of 74 total cases heard in 2008 (Judicial and Court Statistics 2008).
18 See https://www.gov.uk/guidance/opinions-resolving-patent-disputes (last visited 05 Nov 2015).
19 See Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Zodiac Seats UK Ltd (formerly known as Contour Aerospace Ltd)
[2013] UKSC 46.
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2.3 France
The patent litigation system in France is illustrated in Fig. 3. Until June 2008, there
were 10 specialised courts (Tribunaux de Grande Instance—TGI) that dealt with
actions involving patent infringement and the related issue of unfair competition.
Out of the 10 courts that heard patent cases until mid-2008, only two (Paris and
Lyon) had specialist patent judges. These two courts, together with the court in
Lille, heard the vast majority of patent actions.20 The decisions of the TGIs could be
appealed before the Court of Appeal (Cour d’Appel—CdA) which had the territorial
jurisdiction for the relevant TGI.21 Since 2009 the TGI in Paris has the exclusive
jurisdiction for all patent cases.22 Therefore, the only competent CdA is now the
CdA in Paris. The decisions of a CdA can be appealed to the Supreme Court (Cour
de Cassation—CdC).23
1st Instance Infringement & Validity
District Court (Tribunal de Grande Instance – TGI) in Paris
Stay possible but rare; no disclosure; experts rarely involved
Invalidity may be raised as:
Proceedings available to Patentee
stay
request
Proceedings available to Alleged Infringer
Interim Proceedings
District Court (TGI)
(e.g. prelim. Injuncon; saisie
contrefaçon, etc.)
Opposion
EPO
Appeal
EPO
1st Appeal Infringement & Validity
Court of Appeal (Cour d'appel)
2nd Appeal Infringement & Validity
Supreme Court (Cour de Cassaon)
Enforcement Proceedings
Judgments can be provisionally enforceable
– if so usually without security
1st Instance re Amount of Damages
District Court (TGI)
Defense Separate AconCounterclaim
Cost Proceedings
Only a small part of the real costs
are shied
Fig. 3 Overview of the patent litigation system in France
20 See Ladas and Perry (2002) and Ve´ron (2002, p. 388).
21 See Art. R 211-1 COJ.
22 See Art. L615-17 CPI and D211-6 COJ (decree dated 9th October 2009).
23 See Art. L 111-2 COJ.
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There is no opposition procedure to challenge French national patents at the
Institut National de la Proprie´te´ Industrielle (INPI).24 The validity of French
national patents and French-validated EPs can be examined by the TGI. Like in the
UK, there is no German-style specialized, separate court for revocation actions. If
infringement proceedings are already pending, invalidity can be raised as a
counterclaim or defense.25 However, the validity of FR patents and the French part
of an EP can also be challenged in an isolated revocation action.26 However,
standalone actions for revocation are very rare in France (Ve´ron 2010). In most
cases ([90 %) the validity issues are raised as a counterclaim for revocation.27 The
courts have wide discretion to stay proceedings during a pending opposition at the
EPO, but do so only if they find that the likelihood of success of the opposition is
high and if the balance of the party’s interests does not contradict a stay.28
2.4 The Netherlands
Figure 4 shows the Dutch patent litigation system schematically. Since 1987 The
Netherlands has had a highly centralized system of patent enforcement.29 All patent
matters must be brought before the courts in The Hague (s’Gravenhage), which
have exclusive jurisdiction.30 First instance actions must be filed at the patent
chamber of the district court (Rechtbank) and an appeal may be taken to the patent
chamber of the court of appeal (Gerechtshof). Appeal decisions may be subject to
final judgment at the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
There is no opposition procedure for Dutch national patents comparable with that
of the EPO for EPs. In Dutch legal actions, infringement and validity of Dutch
national patents and Dutch-validated EPs are dealt with by the same court, either in
the same proceedings (when invalidity is raised as a means of defense), in separate
but simultaneous proceedings (a revocation action by way of a counterclaim), or in
separate revocation proceedings.31
The validity of a Dutch national patent can always be challenged in court.32 By
contrast, if the validity of the Dutch part of a European patent is challenged in the
Dutch courts while opposition proceedings are pending, the revocation proceedings
24 See Ve´ron (2002, p. 387).
25 There is an important difference between the defense for revocation and the counterclaim for
revocation. A counterclaim constitutes a claim of the defendant and results, when it is admitted, in the
revocation of the patent. The defense for revocation is only a defense means and results only in the
dismissal of the claim for infringement and the patent remains in force, see Ve´ron (2002, p. 387) for the
details.
26 See Art. L613-25 and L614-12 CPI.
27 See Ve´ron (2002, p. 387), who estimates inter alia that only 5 % of the actions are isolated actions.
28 See Hogan Lovells (2013).
29 Before 1987 all 19 district courts had the jurisdiction to hear patent infringement cases, see Brinkhof
(2000, p. 707).
30 See Sec. 80 DPA.
31 See CMS (2013, p. 61).
32 See Art. 75 DPA.
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are usually stayed. However, Dutch infringement proceedings are normally not
stayed while an EPO opposition proceeding is pending.33
2.5 Differences across jurisdictions
Having described the characteristics of the different enforcement systems, we
highlight in this section a number of differences across the four systems which have
important effects on litigation behavior and hence the data described in the next
section. Table 1 summarizes the main differences across the jurisdictions, which are
explained in more detail below.
2.5.1 Bifurcation
A major difference between the four legal systems is that Germany uses a bifurcated
system. This is not the case in any of the other three legal systems covered by our
analysis.
1st Instance Infringement & Validity
District Court (Rechtbank, RB) in The Hague
Stay possible but rare; no disclosure; experts rarely involved
Invalidity may be raised as:
Proceedings available to Patentee
stay
request
Proceedings available to Alleged Infringer
Interim Proceedings
District Court (RB)
(e.g. prelim. injuncon; search and
seizure of evidence)
Opposion
EPO
Appeal
EPO
1st Appeal Infringement & Validity
Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof)
2nd Appeal Infringement & Validity
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad)
Enforcement Proceedings
Judgments can be provisionally enforceable
– if so usually without Security
1st Instance re Amount of Damages
District Court (RB)
Defense Separate AconCounterclaim
Cost Proceedings
Full costs can be shied since 2007
Fig. 4 Overview of the patent litigation system in The Netherlands
33 See Swens and Reijns (2011, p. 4).
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Due to the existence of bifurcation it is possible for a regional court in Germany
to grant an injunction against a potential infringer of a patent which is later found to
be invalid by the EPO, DPMA or the Federal Patent Court.34 Another potential issue
is that regional courts, which decide on infringement, and the Federal Patent Court
that decides on validity construct claims independently of each other. This might
lead to inconsistent claim constructions in the infringement and revocation
procedures. This is often referred to as the Angora cat problem where the patentee
applies the broadest possible interpretation of the patent claims in infringement
procedures (a fluffy, blow-dried cat) and the narrowest possible interpretation in
revocation proceedings (a wet, rolled-up cat). This creates the problem that an
infringement court might issue an injunction against a defendant on the basis of a
broad claim construction which would inevitably lead to the invalidation in view of
a certain piece of prior art. At the Federal Patent court, in contrast, the patentee uses
the narrow interpretation, which leads to the patent being upheld. Furthermore, there
could be fewer counterclaims for revocation in the bifurcated system as costs
involved in engaging in an additional, separate court action may be prohibitive,
especially for smaller, resource-constrained companies. There is also the possibility
that an alleged infringer drops the validity challenge as soon as the LG confirms that
no infringement has taken place. Since a successful invalidity challenge produces
positive externalities for other companies, in particular the challenger’s competitors
that might also infringe the patent, the challenger has strong incentives to drop the
challenge once its own situation has been clarified by the infringement court.
On the other hand, exclusive jurisdiction on patent validity offers the advantage
of specialization. The Federal Patent Court charged with validity cases can train and
deploy technical judges and accumulate experience specifically in the assessment of
patent validity, facilitating coherent and well-founded claim construction and
therefore increase legal certainty regarding the validity of patents. Since separate
patent revocation proceedings increase the costs and risks for the alleged infringer,
the separation of infringement and revocation procedures may lead alleged
infringers to refrain from filing a revocation action if they have relatively low
chances of success. Moreover, the strong presumption of validity, which puts
considerable faith in the examination of the patent offices, could allow for a fast
assessment of infringement claims, because validity does not need to be assessed
simultaneously.
2.5.2 Number of competent courts
Another major difference between the legal systems is that in Germany several
regional courts are competent to hear patent infringement cases; by contrast the UK,
France (since 2009) and The Netherlands all make use of centralized systems for
patent litigation.
This means that claimants in Germany can usually choose among several
regional courts where to file an infringement claim. In the UK, depending on the
34 For more discussion and empirical evidence on this ‘‘invalid but infringed’’ scenario see Cremers et al.
(2014).
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size and value of the claim, the filing will typically be either at the PCC (IPEC) or
the PHC (both are located in London); while in France patent cases must be taken to
the TGI in Paris; and in The Netherlands first instance actions must be filed at the
patent chamber of the district court in The Hague. In practice, this difference is
mitigated somewhat by the strong concentration of cases in Germany in three out of
the twelve competent courts—Du¨sseldorf, Munich and Mannheim.
2.5.3 Duration of the proceedings
In Germany, proceedings before the LG tend to be relatively speedy with the (first)
oral hearing scheduled after 6–12 months, and judgment 1–3 months after the
(second) oral hearing. Revocation decisions by the BPatG take usually at least
18 months after the filing of the revocation suit before the BPatG. In this respect it is
important to recall that revocation actions are usually reactive actions and therefore
filed after the infringement action has been initiated. Similarly, in The Netherlands
proceedings are comparatively speedy—both Germany and The Netherlands follow
a paper-based litigation procedure, with short oral hearings.
Regarding time limits, in the UK first instance cases filed before the PHC often
take 12 months to reach full trial, but urgent cases can sometimes be heard within
6 months. Trial hearings are lengthy due to the presence of oral arguments and
cross-examination, and trials can last from several days to a number of weeks. The
first instance PHC judgment will usually be handed down within 2–12 weeks of the
trial. Therefore, there is a typical overall length of around 12–14 months from filing
to judgment, though complex cases can take longer. In France, first instance actions
take on average about 18–24 months from claim to judgment.
2.5.4 Preliminary injunctions
In Germany preliminary proceedings are rare in patent cases due to the speed of the
normal infringement proceedings and the strict requirements for granting prelim-
inary relief. Instead, permanent injunctions can be granted by the LG based
exclusively on an assessment of the infringement claims. As noted above with
regard to bifurcation, if the LG does not stay the infringement proceedings, the
claim for injunctive relief is granted about a year before the question of validity is
even considered by the Federal Patent Court.
In France, preliminary proceedings—the saisie-contrefac¸on—are commonly
used to initiate infringement actions. As noted above, the court in France may order
the seizure of the defendant’s goods within a few weeks of the action. Nevertheless,
preliminary injunctions tend to be rare in France. This is also the case in the
litigation system of the UK (England and Wales), where preliminary injunctions are
relatively uncommon in patent cases. This might be partly explained by the practice
of ‘‘clearing the way’’—in the UK it is expected that a potential infringer should
attempt to ‘‘clear the way’’ before bringing products to market that could potentially
infringe a competitor’s patent(s) by proactively seeking revocation of the
competitor’s patent(s), or alternatively, to seek a declaration of non-infringement.
If they do so, they can avoid the possibility of an interim injunction being granted
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against them if the competitor decides to take patent infringement proceedings.35 If
a potential infringer does not do this, it is more likely that the PHC will grant a
preliminary injunction preventing the sale of the potentially infringing product upon
the commencement of infringement proceedings. In The Netherlands, the Kort
Geding, a system of preliminary relief proceedings, comes into play. A preliminary
injunction to halt infringing activities may be obtained within two weeks after filing
a case. It also used to be commonplace in The Netherlands for a cross-border
injunction to be granted with respect to infringement actions.
2.5.5 Costs and fee shifting
Since German infringement proceedings do not foresee extensive pre-trial
disclosure of information and only short hearings usually without experts,
proceedings are usually considerably less expensive than in other jurisdictions
even if the same hourly rates for attorneys apply. Practitioners estimate the average
costs to range between EUR 40,000 and EUR 100,000 per party.36 The attorney fees
are calculated according to a formula based on the estimated value of the dispute.37
These fees are the basis for the reimbursement of costs which the winner of a case
can demand from the loser. However, the attorney fees do not represent the true
legal costs, but only a lower bound to which the attorney is entitled. Clients and
their attorneys often agree to payment schemes based on an hourly rate which leads
to attorney costs well above the legal fees. As a result, the costs are often not fully
shifted to the loser.
In the UK, practitioners estimate the costs of a case which reaches trial to be at
GBP 1.5 million for each side.38 These estimates are supported by the research
undertaken by Helmers and McDonagh (2013b) which show costs often ranging
between GBP 1 million and GBP 6 million (encompassing the costs from both
sides) for cases initiated during 2000–2008.39 The main reasons for the relatively
high costs are the disclosure requirement, the length of trial, the requirements for the
carrying out of experiments and the cross-examination of expert witnesses. The
loser pays costs system applies in this context—the losing litigant must pay not only
his own costs, but also the costs of the other side. However, it is also important to
note that such costs are allocated via an issue-based approach; depending on who
lost which issue in the case, and taking into account how much court time the issue
took to resolve, the court allocates the costs to each side on a proportionate basis
35 Jacob J. (as he then was) noted: ‘‘Where litigation is bound to ensue if the defendant introduces his
product he can avoid all the problems of an interim injunction if he clears the way first. That is what the
procedures for revocation and declaration of non-infringement are for.’’—SmithKlineBeecham v Apotex
[2002] EWHC 2556(Pat) at para. 68.
36 See CMS (2013, p. 47) and Bardehle (2013, p. 12).
37 The value in dispute (VID) is set by the court and can range from EUR 300 to EUR 30 Million (see §
39 (1) Litigation cost act (GKG)). Practitioners estimate the average value in dispute to be typically
between EUR 500,000 and EUR 5 million, see Bardehle (2013, p. 12).
38 See Freshfields (2011, p. 8).
39 See Helmers and McDonagh (2013b, p. 384).
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also taking into consideration whether costs incurred were reasonable under the
circumstances of the case.40
In French proceedings, the involvement of the court is entirely free.41 Most of the
time, the attorney fees are calculated according to an hourly rate agreed with the
client. The usual costs of the proceedings are estimated to range between EUR
50,000 and EUR 200,000.42 In principle, the French system shifts the costs to the
loser.43 However, in practice the fees are shifted only to a very limited extent. For
example, practitioners estimate that the sum of the granted litigation costs are on
average between EUR 200 and EUR 300 and the granted lawyer’s fees are on
average around EUR 3000.44
Patent litigation in The Netherlands is estimated to cost on average between EUR
60,000 and EUR 200,000.45 In principle, also The Netherlands shift the costs to the
loser. Before the enforcement directive was implemented in 2007, the courts had
usually shifted only a small amount of the fees.46 However, since then full costs
may be shifted.47
There is an important theoretical literature that explores the importance of the
allocation of costs among litigants (Reinganum and Wilde 1986; Spier 1992). The
theoretical literature distinguishes between the American (no fee shifting) and
British (full fee shifting) rule to find that in the presence of asymmetric information
about the likelihood that the claimant prevails at trial, fee shifting encourages out-of
court settlements (Spier 1992). The German and French systems could be
considered as intermediate systems, shifting part of the costs from the winning to
the losing party. In reality, however, in the UK costs are allocated on a per-item
basis, which means that in practice often costs are not fully shifted from the winning
to the losing party (Helmers and McDonagh 2013b).
2.5.6 Utility models
In contrast to the other three jurisdictions, the German Patent and Trademark Office
also grants utility models (Gebrauchsmuster). The legal remedies available to
owners of utility models are the same as those available to patentees. Utility models
differ from patents above all in that they are not subject to substantive examination
by the patent office. As a result, they are registered within only a few months of
filing. At the same time, in case the validity of a utility model is challenged in court,
the burden of proof is on the owner of the utility model to show that the claims are
40 For more discussion see Helmers and McDonagh (2013b, pp. 387–392).
41 See Art. L. 111-2 Code de l’organisation judiciaire (COJ); Ve´ron (2002, p. 400).
42 See van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2009).
43 See Art. 696 and 700 CPC, for details see Reiman (2012, p. 143 seq).
44 See Ve´ron (2002, p. 401).
45 See Harhoff (2009, p. 31).
46 See Brinkhof (2000, p. 721).
47 See § 1019 h Rv and Danisco A/S v. Novozymes A/S, Court of Appeal The Hague, 26 February 2013,
Case no. 200.094.921/01, Dutch version available at http://www.eplawpatentblog.com/eplaw/2013/03/nl-
danisco-v-novozymes-litigation-costs-post-bericap.html (last visited 05 Nov 2015) and Land (2010).
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valid. Utility models are restricted to product claims and their statutory life time is
only 10 years. The existence of utility models in Germany makes a comparison of
case counts across jurisdictions more complicated. Often utility models are used as a
substitute for invention patents in Germany and they can be part of an international
patent family. Inventions may also be protected by a combination of utility and
invention patents. Such a strategy is particularly attractive to applicants if they want
to seek an injunction relatively early.
3 Data collection
The case data were collected from court records in the four countries. We collected
data for cases filed during the period 2000–2008. This captures relatively recent
cases and, given the lengthy nature of patent cases (especially where appeals are
heard), we avoid having a large number of pending cases in the dataset. There were
some important differences in the way we collected the data in the various
jurisdictions—the methods used are briefly described below.
3.1 Germany
Due to the existence of the bifurcated system, the data on infringement and
revocation cases had to be collected separately.
Regional courts which hear infringement cases publish few court records and do
not systematically list cases and types of cases heard before the chambers. Moreover,
there are practically no digital archives of case-related data at the courts.
Comprehensive summary statistics are only available for the BPatG and the
BGH.48 To cover the largest number of court cases possible with the resources
available to us, we chose the three most important (in terms of the number of patent
cases) courts of the 12 existing regional patent courts in Germany: Du¨sseldorf,
Mannheim, and Munich.49 The identification of the relevant patent cases—including
both invention patents and utility models—among other IP related cases such as
trademark or design cases, inventor employee issues and pure licensing issues, was
done by screening all cover pages of written case files in Mannheim and Du¨sseldorf.
In Munich, the identification of patent cases was done based on lists supplied by
judges. The relevant information on the cases is stored in paper format in the court
dockets. That means all case-related information had to be collected manually for
each individual case by physically accessing the court dockets at each regional court.
We started the data collection in Mannheim in spring 2010. We proceeded with
Munich in December 2010 and Du¨sseldorf in December 2011. On average, seven
trainee attorneys were hired in each court location to collect the data from court files
and to digitize the information. We estimate that our data on patent infringement
48 The statistics of the BGH can be accessed at: http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/DE/BGH/Statistik/
statistik_node.html; the statistics for the BPatG are published in the journal Blatt fu¨r Patent-, Muster- und
Zeichenwesen.
49 See Ann (2009).
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actions before the German courts in Mannheim, Du¨sseldorf, and Munich cover
around 80 % of all patent related cases in Germany during the period 2000–2008.50
We also have information on revocation proceedings before the BPatG and its
appeal court, the BGH. Both courts publish all decisions on validity since 2000 on
their websites. Apart from these judgments, we also obtained information on
withdrawn revocation actions from the German Patent and Trademark Office
(DPMA). The available data for revocation actions are complete for the period from
2000 to 2008.
3.2 UK
We collected data on all court cases filed between 2000 and 2008 at the PHC, the
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords/Supreme Court which involved a patent.51
We exclude all cases that represent an appeal to an administrative decision taken by
the UK IPO.52
In contrast to Germany, court records in patent cases are generally, albeit
selectively, published. We therefore collected the data on court cases at the PHC
from a range of online sources. Our starting point was the Patents Court Diary
which, in principle, lists all cases which are scheduled for a hearing or an
application including, for example, a case management conference.53 This means
the diary contains all cases which have been scheduled for a hearing.
It is important to emphasize that any case which settles after filing, but before it is
scheduled for a hearing,54 including a CMC, would not appear on the diary, and
therefore does not form part of our dataset. Nevertheless, cases which settle after
they have been scheduled for a hearing, regardless of whether the hearing eventually
took place, are listed, and therefore form part of our study. We used the information
from the diary to search for court records on the website of the British and Irish
Legal Information Institute,55 the case database of Lexis Nexis,56 as well as Thomson
Reuters’s Westlaw database.57 Nonetheless, these sources did not offer any records
for a number of cases (presumably mostly those settled at an early stage). For these
50 This estimation is supported by Harhoff (2009, p. 26). Having information from all regional courts for
2009, Klos (2010, p. 72 seq.) numbers suggest a share for the three regional courts of merely 70 % of total
court cases. However, Klos (2010, p. 72 seq.) includes all patent related disputes while we focus on
infringement cases only. In line with Stauder (1983), we assume that this divergence is due to a varying
distribution of cases according to subject-matter among courts.
51 We exclude cases heard at the PHC which did not involve a patent e.g. designs cases.
52 We also have data on court cases heard before the PCC (Central London County Court) which we
obtained from the UK IPO. Because the information on cases at the PCC had to be collected directly from
the PCC, we only have detailed information on cases heard in 2007 and 2008. Moreover, the data were
anonymized due to confidentiality restrictions. For this reason, we exclude the PCC data in this analysis—
with the exception of Appendix Table 12 (for more details see Helmers and McDonagh 2013a).
53 See http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/list_patents_diary.htm.
54 Essentially, these are cases which settle after filing but before any court involvement.
55 See http://www.bailii.org (last visited 05 Nov 2015).
56 See http://www.lexisnexis.co.uk. (last visited 05 Nov 2015).
57 See http://www.westlaw.co.uk. (last visited 05 Nov 2015).
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cases we searched additional sources, such as media websites, blogs or the websites
of legal representatives for information.
While our datasets represent the most comprehensive database gathered so far on
the subject of patent litigation in the UK,58 three caveats are in order. First, relying
on the court diary means that we only observe cases that have not only been filed to
the court, but which were also allowed to proceed at least to the case management
stage. There is no information available on the number of cases which are dropped
between the serving of the claim form and the case appearing on the diary. The
number of cases within our dataset is comparable with the official UK Ministry of
Justice (MoJ) statistics on case numbers at the PHC, once the cases which do not
form part of our study, i.e., appeals from the IPO and the non-patent PHC cases, are
removed.59 Secondly, since we had to assemble the information with regard to each
court case, often relying on different sources, the available court records are in
many cases incomplete.60 A particular concern relates to the patent numbers of
litigated patents, because even when a case is decided through judgment the
published judgment may not identify the disputed patents. This means that we have
patent numbers only for 165 out of the 256 patent cases between 2000 and 2008.
Thirdly, with regard to the counting of UK cases, for the purpose of clarity it is
important to note that where a number of separately filed cases involving the same
parties were joined and heard together we considered these cases to be ‘‘one case.’’
3.3 France
The French dataset contains patent cases at the Court of Paris in first and second
instance (Tribunal de Grande Instance—TGI and Cour d’Appel). While Paris has
exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes in France since 2009, ten courts were
sharing jurisdiction over patent disputes during the period 2000–2008 covered by
our data. According to Ve´ron (2002), the TGI in Paris accounted historically for
around 60 % of all patent cases in the country.61
Our data for France originate from a private company, Darts-IP, which
specializes in IP case law. Darts-IP was helpful mainly for two reasons: first, the
TGI is not specialized in patent cases and court registers do not record patent cases
58 The data used by Moss et al. (2010) only contain court cases between January 2008 and August 2009
heard by the Patents County Court, the Patents Court, the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords.
59 For the PHC in 2007 the MoJ lists 55 actions and for 2008 it lists 61 actions. See Ministry of Justice,
Judicial and Court Statistics 2007 (The Stationery Office, September 2008) and Judicial and Court
Statistics 2008 (The Stationery Office, September 2009); accessible at http://www.official-documents.
gov.uk/document/cm76/7697/7697.pdf and http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm74/7467/
7467.pdf. Recently we examined the paper PHC case files at the court. The physical PHC files are mixed
in with regular Chancery Division files, which makes the case-counting extremely challenging and time-
consuming. Nevertheless, counting records for cases filed at the PHC in 2007 revealed that there were an
additional seven cases filed which did not appear in the diary or elsewhere in the online records available
to us.
60 For example, while we may have the judgment of the PHC, we may not have records for all preceding
applications.
61 Ve´ron (2002, p. 388) notes that the distribution of patent cases among the ten courts was highly
skewed as seven out of the ten courts dealt with less than 15 cases per year.
18 Eur J Law Econ (2017) 44:1–44
123
in a specific way that would allow filtering them from the huge collections of all
cases filed at the court. Darts-IP collects decisions from all cases and manually
identifies the nature of the main action, allowing us to filter patent cases. Similar to
the UK, information can be obtained from published court records because in the
French litigation system, as soon as an action is filed at a given TGI, the court
quickly issues an official document called an Ordonnance de mise en e´tat, which
summarizes the claims filed by the claimant and sets the calendar for the case. These
documents reveal most of the features of the case (names of the parties, patent
numbers, filing dates, etc.). Darts-IP obtains data also from the French patent office
(INPI) and Ve´ron and Associe´s (an established law firm) that also collect data on
patent cases at the Paris court. Secondly, Darts-IP analyzes court records and
manually retrieves the information on the litigating parties, patent numbers, filing
and judgment dates, and some other features of the case.
We complemented the Darts-IP data with additional variables that we extracted
manually by a team of four trainee attorneys, including the type of first action,
outcomes, appeals, etc. As in the case of the UK, we then exclude appeals to
administrative decisions of the INPI (the Court of Paris also has jurisdiction as an
appellate level to decisions of the French patent office, but this is not the focus of our
dataset). Once the analysis at the individual decision level was completed, we grouped
all court records into unique cases. This grouping is done in several steps: (1)Darts-IP
links every decision to its antecedent, forming a chain of decisions relating to the same
case (2) we use case references attached to each decision to identify further decisions
belonging to the same case that were not linked by Darts-IP, (3) we look for all
dockets that have at least 2 parties and 1 patent family in common and manually check
whether these belong to the same action, in which case we merge them into a single
case record. This aggregation is presumably the main reason why the figures presented
in Table 3 below differ significantly from the case counts in Ve´ron (2010) and
Graham and van Zeebroeck (2014) for the TGI Paris for the same time period. Case-
level variables are then computed or aggregated based on decision-level variables.
Settlements are identified through the issuance of De´sistments or Re´vocation orders,
in which the court acknowledges that the charges are dropped by the claimant.
3.4 The Netherlands
The dataset for The Netherlands was collected and constructed in the same way as
the French dataset, with two main differences. First, one court has exclusive
jurisdiction over all patent cases in The Netherlands throughout our period of
interest: the Court of The Hague (s’Gravenhage). Second, in contrast to France, in
the Dutch system there is almost no automatic release of court records once a case is
filed (e.g. ordonnances de mise en e´tat). Neither is there a court diary as in the case
of the PHC in England and Wales. As a result, our dataset may miss a substantial
number of cases that were settled before any court decision was made, and may fail
to identify some settlements as the court does not publish anything once a case is
dismissed. However, Graham and van Zeebroeck (2014), quoting practitioners in
The Netherlands, indicate that only an estimated 10–15 % of patent cases are
typically settled each year in the country.
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3.5 Identification of cases litigated in multiple jurisdictions
To identify parallel cases, we proceeded as follows. We used all available patent
numbers of court cases in all four countries and constructed their patent families to
obtain German, UK,62 Dutch, French, as well as EPO equivalents.63
We then matched patent families across the four jurisdictions to identify patents
litigated in several jurisdictions. If we found a patent (family) to be involved in
disputes in more than one jurisdiction, we also cross-checked litigating parties’ names
to ensure the assignee is the same (either as claimant or defendant).64 For example, we
considered a case where patent X is litigated in jurisdiction Y by parties A and B to be
parallel to a case in jurisdiction Z where patent X is litigated by parties A and B.
The search for parallel cases was partly facilitated by data that we collected from
UK court records that provided information on the existence of parallel cases
outside of the UK, including Germany, France, and The Netherlands. This
information is only available when judges refer explicitly to parallel cases in their
judgments. Hence, this information is far from complete. It nevertheless provides
additional information that we used to assist in the identification of parallel cases.
3.6 Case counts
Counting court cases and comparing case counts across jurisdictions is inevitably a
challenge because of the differences in litigation systems described above – notably
bifurcation—as well as the various procedural differences. However, missing data
pose additional challenges. To allow for a meaningful comparison, we present our case
counts using a number of different methods of counting cases while simultaneously
making use of different assumptions about the missing information. Table 2
summarizes the different ways in which we counted cases. In Table 2, the presence
of gray shaded cells indicates that the data necessary to adjust case counts is available
in a given jurisdiction, whereas the presence of white cells means that the data are not
available. Black cells mean the adjustment is not applicable in a given jurisdiction.
For each jurisdiction, we counted all available patent cases regardless of the
underlying claim e.g. infringement, invalidity, ownership dispute etc. Nevertheless,
since we are primarily interested in infringement and revocation (invalidity) cases,
we also computed case counts limited to those claims.65 Further, we adjusted the
number of cases for missing data, primarily with respect to courts not covered by
our data collection in each jurisdiction. In Germany, this concerned nine LGs; in the
62 Note that we do not have patent data for all cases (for example in the case of the UK, we have data for
only 65 % of all cases).
63 We use the extended INPADOC patent family definition in Patstat.
64 For this purpose, we harmonize the names of litigating parties according to established string cleaning
methods. We convert all strings to uppercase, standardize characters to the ISO basic Latin alphabet and
remove punctuation marks. We further remove legal forms and generic suffixes to account for domestic
subsidiaries of multinational corporations. We complement the automated matching of litigating parties’
names with extensive manual checks.
65 We dropped other claims, such as employee inventions, entitlement, etc.
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UK this concerned certain years of the PCC (2000–2006); and in France 9 TGIs.66
Since the German data included utility models, we also provide case counts
excluding utility models.67
Cases that involve several patents are often split by the courts in Germany so that
there are separate case numbers for each patent involved in the case. One way of
accounting for this is to assume that one patent corresponds to one case. Hence, we
count each case once for each patent that it concerns. Alternatively, a way to adjust the
data to take account of this problem is to consolidate all actions that presumably belong
to the same case. Consolidation in this context includes taking account of different
actions that occur at the same time (e.g. where there are different case numbers for each
patent in a case that involves several patents but essentially the same facts/merits) as
well as different actions that take place over time within the same overall case (e.g. an
Table 2 Different ways to count cases
Adjustment DE UK FR NL
Only infringement and revocaon claims
Missing cases (courts not covered)*
Only invenon patents♣
Cases counted once per patent♦
Consolidated at case-levelℜ
Eliminate early seled cases♠
Count counterclaims for revocaon and 
infringement as separate cases
applicable
not applicable
data not available
The table shows the different changes to the ways in which we count court cases across jurisdictions. Some
adjustments are not applicable to all jurisdictions and for some adjustments no data is available in a given
jurisdiction
* 9 LGs not covered in DE, PCC not covered in UK, 9 TGIs not covered in FR
§ Excludes utility models for DE
r Use average number of patents for UK where for 35 % of cases patents are not available
< For UK cases available only at the consolidated level
“ In UK cases settled before CMC scheduled not covered—exclude cases in DE that settled within
6 weeks after receipt of claim
66 No such adjustment is necessary for the Netherlands as there is only a single court that hears patent
cases.
67 Note that utility models are widely used in Germany and can also be used as substitutes for invention
patents. Hence, it is possible that an invention patent covers a given invention in France whereas the same
invention is covered by a utility model in Germany. For more discussion see Sect. 2.5.6.
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application for a preliminary injunction and the final arguments/judgment). Thus, we
consolidated the data to account for the possibility that several separate actions are
recorded – but in reality they form part of the same case.
Furthermore, as noted above, since we collected the data for the UK principally
from the court diary, cases that settle before they are scheduled for a CMC, or a
preliminary hearing, are not covered by our data. To make the UK and German data
comparable, we dropped from our comparison all cases in Germany that also settled
very early on, i.e., before the court took action on the case.
Finally, within the German bifurcated system infringement and revocation cases
constitute separate cases even when the revocation case is a direct reaction to the
infringement case (or vice versa). One way to replicate this set-up in a non-
bifurcated system is to count counterclaims for both revocation and infringement as
separate cases. These data are available only for the UK, and thus we make this
comparison of German cases only with UK data.
4 Comparison of patent litigation in Germany, the UK, France and The
Netherlands
This section presents the results of our analysis. We compare patent cases across
Germany, the UK, France and The Netherlands.
4.1 Case-Counts
Table 3 shows the total of patent cases for all four jurisdictions over the period
2000–2008.
By far the largest number of cases is heard by German courts. Of the total of 6739
cases in Germany, 5121 are infringement cases heard by the three regional courts
covered by our study whereas 1618 are revocation cases heard by the BPatG.68
The differences apparent in Table 3 may be partly driven by the differences in
economic activity across the four jurisdictions. Table 4 shows litigation rates
accounting for various macro indicators.
The overall picture does not change once we take into account the total number
of patents, GDP, or total R&D spending: Germany still displays by far the largest
litigation rate regardless of how it is measured. The same is true for the UK—
regardless as to how litigation activity is counted, patent litigation intensity is lower
in the UK than in any of the other three jurisdictions.
Table 11 in the Appendix shows case counts for Germany if we use alternative
ways of defining a case (see Table 2 for an overview). If we restrict the case count
to cases that claim infringement or revocation, the overall count falls by around 8 %
to 6220. In contrast, if we adjust the count for the fact that we covered only the three
most important regional courts, case counts jump up to 8809. If we count each case
once for each patent, the number of cases increases from 6739 to 8134 (an increase
68 The drop of cases in Germany in 2002 is due to an internal decision at the regional court in Du¨sseldorf
to remove and destroy files and only store decisions in the court archive.
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of 30 %). This underscores that not all German courts do systematically split cases
according to the number of patents involved. Reducing the case count to cases that
only involve invention patents means the count drops to 3700. However, given the
widespread use of utility models in Germany, often as a substitute to invention
patents, looking only at invention patent cases might be too narrow a focus. Column
[F] of Table 11 shows consolidated case counts and hence accounts for any
potential over-counting due to case-splitting. The resulting case count is only
slightly less than 70 % of the original count. Finally, we drop all cases that settled
very early on, essentially before the court took any action (within 42 days counting
from the filing date of the claim, which is the period where parties had to file their
first response to the court). This accounts for the concern that such cases might be
missing from the UK case count. However, we see that the number of cases that
drop out at such an early stage is very low in Germany.
Table 12 in the Appendix shows case counts for the UK after making various
adjustments. When we add the available data for the PCC in 2007 and 2008, we see
that the case count increases by slightly less than 20 %. Nevertheless, if we assume
that the PCC heard on average 20 % of patent cases during 2000–2008, the total
case count would increase to 307. Column [D] shows that if we counted each case
once per patent at issue, we would end up with a count of 363 cases. Mimicking a
Table 3 Case overview
Year claim
filed
Jurisdiction Total
DE FR NL UK
Regional courtsa
(infringement)
BPatG
(revocation)
Total
2000 397 171 568 106 42 19 735
2001 483 165 648 126 40 22 836
2002 179 129 308 125 31 24 488
2003 520 144 664 85 19 28 796
2004 700 170 870 120 45 27 1062
2005 736 196 932 118 40 28 1118
2006 617 197 814 129 35 40 1018
2007 795 195 990 106 36 31 1163
2008 694 251 945 87 38 37 1107
Total 5121 1618 6739 1002 326 256 8323
Total
correctedb
8424 1503 326 302
BPatG: Federal Patent Court
a Missing case files at the regional court in Du¨sseldorf for the year 2002
b Numbers account for the fact that not all court cases are included in our data. Approximately 25 % of
cases missing in DE, 50 % in FR, 0 % in NL, and 18 % in the UK (see Appendix Tables 11, 12, 13 and
14 for annual data)
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bifurcated system, Column [E] counts counterclaims for infringement and
revocation as separate cases. This results in a total count of 356.69
The total caseload in France is 1002. In contrast to Germany and the UK, there is
no increase in case filings over time. Due to more limited data, Table 13 in the
Appendix shows only a few variations of the case count for France. Multiplying
case counts by the number of patents involved (Column [D]) results only in a
modest 10 % increase in case counts. However, adjusting for cases that were heard
by courts not covered by our data, we obtain a count of 1503 cases.
Finally, the caseload in The Netherlands with 329 cases is only slightly larger
than in the UK. Since all cases are heard by a single court, in principle, no
adjustment for missing cases is needed. If we count cases once for each patent at
issue, the case count increases to 339 cases.
A few caveats are in order in interpreting these numbers. First, our data cover
only cases that were filed between 2000 and 2008. It is possible that the case
numbers have changed significantly since then. In fact, more recent data for the UK
for both the PCC and the PHC suggest that case counts have increased substantially
since 2000–2008, partially as a result of the reforms of the PCC (IPEC). Helmers
et al. (2015) show that patent case counts at the PHC increased to 92 and 89 in 2011
and 2012 respectively. Patent case counts at the PCC increased even more
dramatically from 8 in 2010 to 27 in 2011 largely as a consequence of the IPEC
reforms (for detailed discussion see Helmers et al. 2015). In the case of Germany,
the evidence is slightly less conclusive. Ku¨hnen and Claessen (2013, p. 593) suggest
that 475 cases have been filed at the Du¨sseldorf court in 2011 (compared to 437 in
2008). Whereas this is a modest increase (9 %), the increase at the LG Mannheim
between 2008 and 2011 is more substantial (27 %) albeit still relatively modest in
absolute terms (56 cases) in light of the large overall annual caseload in Germany.
Second, and presumably more importantly, the data for France and The Netherlands
are subject to important limitations. For France, we have an estimated 60 % of cases
overall, and in The Netherlands, the low settlement ratios at The Hague court
suggests that we are missing most cases that were settled (an estimated 10–15 % of
cases according to Graham and van Zeebroeck (2014)). A recent consultation of
overall statistics produced by Darts-IP70 indicate that there were about 400 first-
instance decisions per year in France in the period 2011-2014, which is twice as
many cases as in our observation period (2000-2008). It is however impossible to
determine the share of this doubling in counts that comes from more systematic case
collection at Darts-IP and that coming from a true increase in case-loads. In
contrast, in The Netherlands, counts of yearly first-instance decisions in the Darts-
IP database have only increased by 7 % between the two periods.
69 One might argue that combining [D] and [E] produces a case count that is most directly comparable
with the German figures. However, as discussed above, this is not entirely true because in Germany cases
are not systematically split according to the number of patents at issue. In any case, even if we combine
[D] and [E], the total case count reaches only slightly more than 500 cases.
70 www.darts-ip.com, last visited 05 Nov 2015.
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4.2 Case-level comparison
Table 5 cross-tabulates claims and information on whether a case ended with a court
decision. We distinguish between infringement and revocation claims and an ‘‘other’’
category that contains other types of patent related claims such as entitlement,
royalty payments etc. There are some interesting differences both within and across
countries with regard to whether a case ends with a judgment on the merits.
In both France and Germany, there is no difference between the shares of
infringement and revocation cases that are decided by judgment. In the UK,
interestingly, a larger share of revocation than infringement cases is litigated
through to judgment. In The Netherlands, almost all cases are decided by the court
according to our data, but again it is likely we are missing most settled cases and the
data for The Netherlands should therefore be interpreted with caution.
Other claims include disputes over employee inventions, royalty payments, the
ownership of patents etc.
There are also substantial differences between jurisdictions: whereas in Germany
around 43 % of infringement and revocation actions end with a judgment on the
merits, the shares in the UK and France are respectively 50 % and almost 100 % as
large, regardless of the claim brought by claimants. However, recall that we may be
Table 5 Case outcome and duration, 2000–2008
Jurisdiction Final judgement reached Duration in monthsa
Claim # Cases % Mean Median Mean Median
DE Infringement 1982 43.1 13.6 10.9
Revocation 701 43.3 21.8 19.9
Other 475 39.5 10.2 7.2
No counterclaimb
UK Infringement 69 63.3 12.3 11.3 8.6 10.2
Revocation 59 72.8 10.8 11.2 10.3 11.1
Other 20 66.7 10.7 8.6 13.0 11.8
FR Infringement 704 83.7 29.5 24.2
Revocation 56 82.4 30.2 27.6
Other 151 68.3 19.3 19.8
NLc Infringement 254 97.3 14.9 10.1
Revocation 40 97.6 18.1 11.8
Other 0 0.0 Na Na
a Computed as difference between date when case was filed and first judgment. This includes cases where
a decision on the request for a preliminary injunction is the final judgment of the case; that is, the
preliminary injunction was not followed by a main proceeding
b Restricted to cases where either infringement or revocation at issue (no counterclaim)
c Most settled cases (an estimated 10–15 % of the total according to Graham and van Zeebroeck (2014))
are likely to be missing in our data
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missing some early settlements in these two countries.71 As mentioned above, the
bifurcated system may encourage settlements either to avoid the dreaded ‘‘invalid
but infringed’’ scenario or the invalidation of a patent, which would account for
some of the observed differences in settlement rates.
Table 5 also shows average and median durations of cases until a first judgment on
the merits of a case is handed down. We choose the first enforceable decision on the
merits of the case to ensure time lags are comparable across jurisdictions. Decisions to
appeal are endogenous to the differences in appeal procedures across countries.
The figures suggest that the median duration of an infringement case is shortest in
the Netherlands (10.1 months), followed by Germany (10.9 months) and the UK
(11.3 months). Infringement cases take a lot longer in France (24.2 months).
Revocation actions take a lot longer to decide in Germany (19.9 months) and France
(27.6 months) than in the UK (11.2 months) and The Netherlands (11.8 months).
The relatively fast decisions in infringement cases in Germany could be the
outcome of courts focusing on the issue of infringement, relying on the assumption
of validity. We have data on counterclaims for the UK that allow us to compare the
duration of cases in the UK where only infringement or revocation were at issue
(i.e., no counterclaims). However, the defendant’s decision not to file a counter-
claim is obviously an endogenous choice which means that the set of cases where no
counterclaim is filed might have characteristics that are correlated with the duration
of the case (and hence the figures may not be reliable). Regardless, Table 5 shows
that the average case length for cases where only either infringement or revocation
were at issue does not differ much relative to the broader set of cases that includes
counterclaims (emphasis should be put on the median duration due to the small
number of observations).
Table 6 cross-tabulates claims and their corresponding outcomes. There are large
differences across jurisdictions with regard to case outcomes.
In Germany, about a fifth of infringement cases with a decision end with the
judge holding a patent infringed (regardless of whether validity is challenged and
the patent eventually held invalid by the BPatG).72 This share is a lot larger in The
Netherlands (36 %). In France, in contrast, only a small share (5.6 %) of patents is
held infringed (of cases that end with a judgment) and most patents are held valid
(including cases where validity was not challenged) but not infringed, but again we
71 Our settlement rate in France is consistent with earlier findings by Ve´ron (2010) and Graham and van
Zeebroeck (2014), but is based on the same source of information: ‘‘ordonnances de mise en e´tat’’. In case
a dispute is settled before such an order is issued by the court (usually within a few weeks), it will not
show up in our data.
72 In Germany some infringement proceedings contain more than one patent and all of the patents could
be challenged individually in multiple revocation proceedings. This means that we summarize case
outcomes such that there is only a single outcome for potentially several revocation cases corresponding
to an infringement outcome. If there were more than one revocation proceeding on one particular patent
with varying outcomes, we used the latest available outcome. If there were different outcomes in
revocation proceedings on several patents that were all related to a single infringement case, we defined
the outcome ‘‘revoked’’ when at least one patent was revoked. If there were multiple outcomes for the
different patents, we always chose the court decision if available instead of a settlement (i.e., if one patent
revocation action was settled and the other decided with a revocation, we code the case outcome as
revocation).
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caution that our outcome data for France is incomplete and thus, these data should
be interpreted with care.
In the UK, the large share of revoked patents is striking. A large share of claims
challenges the validity of a patent without the validity challenge being triggered
by an infringement claim. Among these cases, 35.4 % end with the revocation of
the patent at issue. The main reason for the high proportion of UK revocation
cases relative to other countries is that since the 2001 case of Smithkline Beecham
plc v Generics (UK) Ltd the UK has developed the principle of ‘‘clearing the
way.’’ The effect of this is that parties who are bringing products to market that
could potentially infringe a competitor’s patent(s) are encouraged to seek
revocation of the competitor’s patent(s), or alternatively, to seek a declaration
of non-infringement. If they do so, they can avoid the possibility of an interim
injunction being granted against them if the competitor decides to take patent
infringement proceedings. Furthermore, also the revocation rate among cases that
allege infringement is high (41.8 %). The share of infringement cases (that are
decided by judgment) in Germany that end with revocation is significantly lower
(22.3 %). This is perhaps surprising since in only about a third of all infringement
Table 6 Outcomes for infringement and revocation claims
Claim Outcome
Infringed Not infringed/not
revoked
Revoked Settled
# %b # %b # %b # %
Infringement only DE 957 25.4 357 9.5 1811 48.1
FRa
NLa
UKd 3 7.1 6 14.3 24 57.1
Revocation only DE 134 14.3 278 29.7 436 46.6
FRa 45 66.2 11 16.2 12 17.6
NLa 11 26.8 29 70.7 1 2.4
UKd 10 20.8 17 35.4 14 29.2
Infringement and revocation
(counterclaim)c
DE 208 15.7 164 12.4 296 22.3 623 47.0
FRa 47 5.6 630 74.9 27 3.2 137 16.3
NLa 94 36.0 137 52.5 23 8.8 7 2.7
UKd 13 19.4 5 7.5 28 41.8 12 17.9
Rows do not add up to 100 %. The difference is due to cases for which no outcome information is
available and/or cases with ‘‘other’’ decisions, such as the refusal of an interim injunction or summary
judgment
a Data not available or incomplete for FR and NL
b Percent of decided cases
c Counted as number of infringement claims
d Britain
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cases the alleged infringer files a claim for revocation with the BPatG.73 One
might expect that this selection mechanism increases the chances that, provided
validity is challenged, the patent is indeed eventually revoked. Instead, most cases
settle (47.0 %). This illustrates the possible effect of bifurcation on settlement
behavior discussed above.
Table 7 lists the share of litigated patents according to the patent office that
published/granted the patent right. Domestic patents account for 57.6 % in Germany
but for only 16.2 % in the UK. The table also shows the share of litigated EPs that
were validated in any of the four jurisdictions.74 The figures reveal that most EPs are
validated in all four jurisdictions. The highest validation rate is found for Germany
(93.4 % on average), which reflects the relatively large market size of the German
economy within Europe. The lowest validation rate (63.2 %) is found for The
Netherlands, which again reflects the relative (lower) importance of the Dutch
economy. The large share of patents validated in all four jurisdictions underscores
the fragmentation of the European patent system. While the same patent right is
granted in several European jurisdictions, it has to be litigated in each jurisdiction
separately.
Our data also allow us to identify cross-border litigation, i.e., cases that were
litigated in multiple jurisdictions. That is, the same patent and the same claimants/
defendants are involved in separate court cases in different jurisdictions. Table 8
tabulates the number of parallel cases across the four jurisdictions.75 Because
patents granted under the EPC are treated as national property rights in each
validated member state of the EPC, they have to be enforced and invalidated in each
jurisdiction separately.76 This raises concerns regarding the efficiency and costs of
the system. Even more worryingly, despite the fact that all national parts of an EP
have (at least initially)77 the same claims, court outcomes have often differed across
jurisdictions.78
73 This is significantly lower than in unified systems. For example, Helmers and McDonagh (2013a)
show for the UK that in about 60 % of cases alleging infringement, the defendant counter-claims for
revocation.
74 We use legal status information to distinguish designation from validation; hence, we are able to tell
whether a patent that was granted by the EPO became effective in an EPC member state.
75 This analysis is conducted on the patent level accompanied by identification of at least one common
litigant in each of the jurisdictions.
76 See Articles 2 and 64(3) EPC.
77 After the opposition deadline has lapsed, the national parts of an EP patent can only be attacked
separately before the national courts. Therefore, the claims of the national parts of the EP might change
during these proceedings when certain claims are revoked.
78 Mejer and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2012, pp. 226–232) report several case studies showing the
diverging (inconsistent) decisions in different European jurisdictions regarding the same patent. Perhaps
the most well-known case is that of Epilady v. Remington where infringement of Epilady’s patent was
found in Germany and the Netherlands but not in the UK and France.
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Table 8 shows parallel cases according to two definitions as explained in
Sect. 3.6. The first type of parallel cases is less restrictive and means that the
assignee of a patent is involved in law suits in several jurisdictions with potentially
different adversaries. The second definition only captures cases where the claimant
Table 7 Patent type and national validations
Jurisdiction Domestic (%) EPO Other (%)
% Also validated in
DE FR NL UKa
DE 57.6 42.4 88.6 57.7 85.5 0.0
FR 58.8 38.7 89.3 59.6 84.3 2.5
NL 25.8 72.6 96.0 91.7 89.9 1.6
UK 16.2 80.6 94.8 96.0 72.4 3.2
Average 93.4 92.1 63.2 86.6
Validations in country where a patent is litigated may be less than 100 % because in some cases, patents
that have not yet been granted are subject to litigation
a Britain
Table 8 Parallel cases (2000–2008)
DE FR NL UKb Cases with parallel casea Total casesa Share
Parallel cases (same patent, either same claimant or defendant)
DE 102 71 61 1009 6427 15.7
FR 816 33 27 113 840 13.5
NL 517 31 38 92 302 30.5
UK 505 24 41 84 165 50.9
Total 1838 157 145 126
Parallel cases (same patent and same claimant and defendant)
DE 34 24 21 127 5121 2.5
FR 68 16 13 51 840 6.1
NL 46 16 18 44 302 14.6
UKb 35 14 19 43 166c 25.9
Total 149 64 59 52
Parallel cases have been identified on the basis of patent numbers as well as claimants and defendants
The table shows the number of parallel cases for each jurisdiction pair—a given case in jurisdiction X can
correspond to multiple cases in jurisdiction Y for reasons discussed in Sects. 2 and 4.1. For example, 68
cases in Germany were also litigated in France; in France these 68 German cases correspond to only 34
cases
a For which patent numbers available
b Britain
c Exceeds number of cases where patents are available because 1 case was retrieved from references in
UK court records to parallel cases in other jurisdictions
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and defendant face each other in multiple jurisdictions over the same disputed
patent—these are the cases that could be considered as duplication due to the
fragmentation of the European enforcement system. Table 8 shows that the share of
parallel cases is considerably larger for the broad definition of parallel cases. But
even when we restrict the set of cases to the second, more restrictive definition, we
still find a non-negligible number of parallel cases: 149 for Germany, 64 for France,
59 for The Netherlands, and 52 for the UK. If we count each case only once
regardless of the number of cases in other jurisdictions it is involved in, we find for
the UK and The Netherlands relatively larger shares of cases that are litigated in
several jurisdictions (25.9 % in the UK and 14.6 % in The Netherlands).
Conversely, the rate of duplication among patents litigated in Germany is tiny
(2.5 %). However, the number of cases in the UK and The Netherlands is
considerably lower than in Germany, which determines the upper bound for the
share of duplicated cases in Germany.79
Although overall the share of cases that are litigated in multiple jurisdictions is
modest, perhaps the more important aspect of parallel litigation is consistency of
outcomes when there is parallel litigation of the same case. Table 9 looks at the
issue by cross-tabulating the case outcomes for parallel cases.80 We find that only a
small share of cases yields consistent outcomes across the jurisdictions in which
they are litigated. Only around 28.6 % of cases that are litigated in Germany and the
UK reach the same outcome. The fraction is even lower for cases litigated in both
Germany and The Netherlands (22.7 %). The interpretation of these numbers is
difficult, however. For example, if infringement is found in Germany first, a
settlement of the infringement proceedings in the UK may be an optimal response
by both litigants. However, in case a patent is invalidated in Germany and then the
corresponding parallel case in The Netherlands settled, the most likely invalid
patent remains in force in The Netherlands.
These issues in combination with the systematic differences in the frequency of
outcomes shown in Table 6 above imply that the timing of parallel cases may be
important. Table 10 shows the share of parallel cases that were filed first in a given
jurisdiction. The table shows that the only jurisdiction that stands out is The
Netherlands with a disproportionately large share of parallel cases that are initiated
there.
Finally, we focus on parallel cases that involve an EP and ask how many patents
in absolute terms are involved in parallel disputes. Although there are parallel cases
that involve national filings that belong to the same patent family, cases that involve
EPs are of particular interest because the national incarnations of an EP can be
expected to be (initially) identical and hence parallel litigation concerns exactly the
same patent. Figure 5 shows the number of EPs that are involved in parallel
79 Roughly, even if every case litigated in France, the Netherlands, and the UK were duplicated in
Germany, the share of duplicated cases would not exceed 25 %.
80 We show in Table 9 only the statistics for parallel cases that involve Germany mainly because this
provides the largest number of parallel cases. Appendix Table 15 shows statistics also for the other
country-combinations.
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litigation. The figure shows that the majority of EPs are involved in parallel disputes
in only two jurisdictions, above all in Germany and France. Nevertheless, there are a
substantial number of EPs that are litigated in three jurisdictions, above all
Germany, France, and The Netherlands. It is noteworthy that only a negligible
number of EPs are litigated in all four jurisdictions in parallel proceedings.
Table 9 Outcomes of German cases with parallel case in UK, France and Netherlands (2000–2008)
# Parallel
casesa
% Cases with same
outcome
Outcome in DE
Infringed Not
infringed
Revoked Settled Other
outcome
DE-UK Outcome
in UK
35 28.6 % Infringed 0.0 % 0.0 % 66.7 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Not
infringed
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Revoked 0.0 % 60.0 % 33.3 % 42.3 % 0.0 %
Settled 100.0 % 40.0 % 0.0 % 34.6 % 0.0 %
Other
outcome
0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 23.1 % 0.0 %
Total # of
cases
1 5 3 26 0
DE-FR Outcome in FR
64 50.0 % Infringed 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 2.4 % 0.0 %
Not infringed 20.0 % 14.3 % 33.3 % 12.2 % 20.0 %
Revoked 0.0 % 14.3 % 16.7 % 2.4 % 0.0 %
Settled 80.0 % 71.4 % 16.7 % 73.2 % 80.0 %
Other outcome 0.0 % 0.0 % 33.3 % 9.8 % 0.0 %
Total # of cases 5 7 6 41 5
DE-NL Outcome in NL
44 22.7 % Infringed 50.0 % 0.0 % 20.0 % 50.0 % 0.0 %
Not infringed 25.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 11.8 % 0.0 %
Revoked 25.0 % 0.0 % 60.0 % 23.5 % 0.0 %
Settled 0.0 % 100.0 % 20.0 % 14.7 % 0.0 %
Other outcome 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Total # of cases 4 1 5 34 0
Parallel cases have been identified on the basis of patent numbers as well as claimants and defendants
Columns for each jurisdiction-pair add up to 100 %; for example, of all parallel cases in DE-UK where
infringement was found in Germany (100 %), 66.7 % of these parallel cases in the UK held the patent
infringed and 33.3 % revoked the patent in the UK
a Number of cases for which information on case outcome available
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5 Conclusion
With the UPC and unitary patent soon to come into being, the European patent
system is about to undergo systemic change. These institutional reforms have been
greeted with cautious optimism within the legal and business communities, though
several concerns remain, particularly with regard to the consistency of decision
making at the UPC as well as the cost of using the UPC and of obtaining unitary
Table 10 Parallel cases (2000–2008)
Jurisdiction where claim
filed
Filed first in DE
(%)
Filed first in FR
(%)
Filed first in NL
(%)
Filed first in UK
(%)b
Filed second in DE 54.8 59.2 41.7
Filed second in FR 45.8 55.6 57.1
Filed second in NL 41.3 38.9 36.8
Filed second in UKa 58.3 42.9 63.2
Parallel cases have been identified on the basis of patent numbers as well as claimants and defendants
The table shows the share of parallel cases for jurisdiction-pairs that was initiated in a given jurisdiction
(based on exact filing date of the initial claim). 100 % is sum of ‘‘filed first in X’’ plus ‘‘filed second in
X’’, for example, ‘‘filed first in UK’’ 41.7 % ? ‘‘filed second in UK’’ 58.3 % = 100 %
a Britain
b Sum of FR-NL and NL-FR is less than 100 % because 1 case was filed on the same date in both
jurisdictions
0 10 20 30 40
Number of EP Patents
DE-FR DE-NL DE-UK FR-NL
FR-UK NL-UK DE-FR-NL DE-FR-UK
DE-NL-UK FR-NL-UK DE-FR-NL-UK
Fig. 5 Parallel cases and EP counts. Notes: the figure shows the number of EPs that are litigated in
multiple jurisdictions. Data covers patent cases filed between 2000 and 2008
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patents (McDonagh 2014). As we noted at the outset, discussions concerning the
reforms of the European patent system—and especially the discourse regarding
changes to the legal and procedural framework of patent enforcement—have been
characterized by a striking lack of representative quantitative evidence. In this
context, our analysis in this article contributes to this ongoing debate by offering
new and comprehensive empirical evidence based on a novel dataset that covers
patent enforcement in four jurisdictions in Europe: Germany, the UK (England and
Wales), France, and The Netherlands.
We also note that for a variety of legal and procedural reasons, European legal
systems are not set up to provide easy access to case information. Therefore, these
data had to be collected from a wide range of sources, including information from
handwritten case records at regional courts (in Germany), online case repositories
(for the UK) and private data providers (for France and The Netherlands). Given
that this is the first authoritative study of its kind, we developed a methodology that
allowed us to transform largely qualitative information collated from court records
into quantitative measures that are comparable across jurisdictions. The analysis of
this novel dataset uncovers a number of interesting differences in patent litigation
patterns across the different jurisdictions.
Our results show that the number of cases heard by German regional courts
exceeds by some distance the number of cases heard in the other three jurisdictions.
This result holds even after accounting for macro-economic indicators related to the
size of the German economy, such as total research and development (R&D)
spending. Even when we account for the over-counting of cases—which occurs
largely due to bifurcation, idiosyncratic practices at regional courts and procedural
differences, as well as taking into account the relative size of the economy—the
number of cases in Germany exceeds the combined number of cases in the other
three jurisdictions over the same time period.
Our data reveal substantial differences across jurisdictions in the outcomes of
cases that were decided by a judgment on the merits of the case. For example, in
cases decided 2000–2008 the UK stands out with a relatively large share of revoked
patents, even when the original claim was for infringement. In Germany, the share
of patents involved in an infringement suit that are ultimately revoked by the
Federal Patent Court is low, a mere 9.2 %. This reflects partly the fact that only in
around a third of infringement cases filed 2000–2008 did the defendant file a claim
for revocation at the Federal Patent Court. It also reflects the existence of relatively
large incentives for the claimant and defendant to settle the revocation proceedings
before a full hearing at the Federal Patent Court. This helps to explain the
comparatively low share of infringement claims that face a counterclaim for
invalidity and the low share of invalidity challenges actually decided by the Federal
Patent Court (Cremers et al. 2014).
Thus, in the UK, revocation is the most likely outcome regardless of whether the
initial claim is for infringement or revocation; and with its emphasis on discovery
and the use of expert opinions, the data for 2000–2008 indicate that the UK courts
offer a favourable setting to invalidate a patent. By contrast, infringement is a
particularly likely outcome at the German courts, which is due in part to the
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bifurcated system where LGs focus only on deciding infringement claims, something
that contributes to Germany’s reputation as a ‘‘patent friendly’’ jurisdiction.
To some extent this explains the popularity of Germany as a patent litigation
venue. In other words, the existence of German bifurcation is not the sole reason for
the disparity in case volumes across the four jurisdictions. Additional reasons for
Germany’s patent litigation dominance include the fact that (i) obtaining an
injunction against a potential infringer in Germany can severely affect that
competitor’s ability to market products successfully in the EU; and (ii) the German
courts have a patentee-friendly reputation, i.e., Germany is seen as the ‘‘go to’’
jurisdiction to obtain an injunction against an infringer on a speedy, cost-effective
basis. This can be contrasted with e.g. the UK which traditionally has been seen as an
‘‘anti-patent’’ jurisdiction, with revocation a likely case outcome, and one that suits
parties who wish to revoke patents rather than parties whose patents have been
infringed. These reputations are shown in our results to be largely accurate for
2000–2008.
Our data additionally allow us to compare across jurisdictions how long it takes
courts to reach a first instance decision on the merits of the case—a crucial issue
with respect to the UPC, given that one of the intentions behind the UPC is to
provide a speedier litigation system. Patent proceedings take around 2 years in
France, but are substantially faster in the other three jurisdictions. We find that the
median durations for infringement cases are 11 months in Germany, 10 months in
The Netherlands, and 11 months in the UK. Claims for revocation (patent
invalidity) are decided fastest in the UK (within less than a year), but take
considerably longer in Germany (on average 22 months).
In addition, with respect to comparisons between Germany and the UK, the fact
that we possess detailed information for cases in the UK enables us to gauge
whether decisions in Germany are relatively faster because of bifurcation—
German courts decide only on either the issue of infringement or the issue of
revocation. This is done by looking only at cases in the UK where no attack on the
validity was raised (either as a defence or as a counterclaim), and hence, where the
court focused solely on the claim brought by the claimant. Interestingly, our
results indicate that focusing on a single issue does not appear to have any
substantial effect on the median duration of a case in the UK. Nevertheless, if the
validity of a patent is challenged in Germany at the Federal Patent Court, the
judgment of the validity case is commonly handed down with a substantial lag
relative to the judgment of the infringement case; moreover, the validity challenge
is usually filed a few months into the infringement case which can increase the
length of the overall dispute.81 Therefore, the total length of a patent dispute in
Germany, if the alleged infringer challenges validity at the Federal Patent Court,
81 The fact that invalidity claims can only be filed at the Federal Patent Court after an opposition at the
German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) or the EPO (or after the period for an opposition has
expired) may further delay the decision on validity.
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takes a lot longer (on average 24 months) than in cases just involving
infringement. Thus, with respect to Germany, while bifurcation has the advantage
that it allows the infringement courts to focus on a single issue, the fact that
invalidity claims are filed with the BPatG a few months after the infringement
claim—coupled with the fact that the BPatG takes a relatively long time to rule on
validity claims—causes considerable delays to the conclusion of a case in
Germany, something that provides strong incentives to parties to settle the
invalidity challenge out of court (even where there is a strong claim the patent is
invalid). Slightly less than 60 % of cases in Germany end with a settlement,
whereas this is true for only around 35 % of cases in the UK. On this point, we
note that similar incentives to settle invalidity challenges, even where the alleged
infringer thinks the patent is invalid, could emerge within the UPC system in cases
where bifurcation occurs. However, given the limits that have been imposed on
case length at the UPC, coupled with the crucial fact that bifurcation will be
optional at the UPC—not mandatory as it is in Germany—it seems unlikely that
incentives to settle (where there is a strong claim the patent is invalid) will
develop into a serious problem with respect to the UPC.
We also demonstrate that the number of cases has increased in the UK and
Germany over time 2000–2008, but there is no evidence for an upward trend in case
filings in France and The Netherlands during this period.82 We cannot give a definite
explanation for why certain jurisdictions feature case loads which are on the
increase and others do not, but, as noted above, Germany’s increasing case load
over time probably shows that its reputation for cost-effective, speedy patent-
friendly litigation continues to spread. Meanwhile, the value of the UK as a venue
for high-quality hearings and decisions on validity makes it a popular venue for
litigants who wish to ‘‘clear the way’’ of potentially disruptive patents.83
We also provide insights regarding one of the other main motivations for the
current reforms of the European patent system: addressing the fragmentation of
patent litigation in Europe. We show that most EPO-granted patents (EPs) that are
litigated in a given jurisdiction have also been validated in all other jurisdictions
(with the possible exception of The Netherlands). This means that at present there is
definite scope for parallel (fragmented) litigation of the same patent in multiple
jurisdictions within Europe. We also offer direct evidence of the fragmentation of
82 Qualitatively, our results are broadly consistent with those provided by Graham and van Zeebroeck
(2014): first, the orders of magnitude of litigation cases per country and country shares in total litigation
are, in general, qualitatively consistent across the two papers – notably, in terms of outcomes, leaving
settlements aside, our results for Germany and the UK in particular are qualitatively similar to the GVZ
article; second, our findings on multi-country litigation complement and refine the findings of the earlier
work by GVZ – our results confirm the relative share of each country in multi-country cases found in the
GVZ article, but we are able to offer more complete information by identifying nearly twice as many
multi-country cases as reported in GVZ (thanks to our more complete coverage of cases in Germany,
where many of these complex cases occur); finally, as with the GVZ paper, we find that where parallel
litigation occurs in different jurisdictions it often leads to different case outcomes.
83 More recent data for the UK also show a very substantial increase in case filings from 2010 onward
(Helmers et al. 2015), which means the trends observed for the 2000–2008 period are difficult to interpret.
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the European patent system. In the UK and The Netherlands we find a relatively
high number of cases that are litigated in several jurisdictions (26 and 15 % of all
cases litigated in the UK and The Netherlands respectively). These shares are a lot
lower in Germany (2 %) and France (6 %). These differences are partly explained
by the fact that the overwhelming share of patents litigated in the UK and The
Netherlands are national parts of European Patents (EPs) (81 and 73 % respectively)
that have also been validated in Germany and France. The share of litigated EPs is a
lot lower in Germany and France (48 and 39 % respectively). If we restrict attention
to EPs only, overall the incidence of duplication is small: only 8.4 % of all litigated
EPs are subject to litigation in more than one country. Most of these EPs are
litigated only in two jurisdictions—we show that the number of patents litigated in
all four jurisdictions is negligible.
Crucially, we find that patents affected by duplicate/parallel litigation appear to
be particularly important, complex and valuable, and as a result the cases are
likely to be more resource-intensive than those concerning other patents. We also
show that the case outcomes of these parallel cases vary substantially across
jurisdictions. Only around a quarter of cases that are litigated both in Germany and
the UK, or in Germany and The Netherlands reach the same outcome. This is
important because it results in situations where the national counterpart of an EP
may be invalidated in one jurisdiction, yet in the parallel case a settlement may
arise. This gives weight to the argument that there is a need for greater legal
certainty and unity of decision-making in the context of patent litigation in
Europe. Nonetheless, quantifying the uncertainty and cost of duplication that
arises from such parallel litigation will require further work. Furthermore, the
UPC court fees have yet to be finalised so it is not possible to accurately estimate a
comparison regarding parallel litigation at present and in the future when the UPC
comes into play. However, the modest share of EPs that are litigated in parallel
may demonstrate that the supposed cost-savings of the UPC could be more modest
than the proponents of the UPC suggest, i.e., if, at present, many patentees only
need to litigate in Germany then why is the wider remit of the UPC required? On
the other hand, it is plausible that parallel litigation may at present be discouraged
due to the complexities (and cost uncertainties) inherent in pursuing litigation
across multiple jurisdictions, something which will be reduced by the UPC. In
other words, the UPC may help to create a market for cross-border patent
enforcement across the UPC member states (McDonagh 2014).
Moreover, looking ahead to the UPC, we note that a striking figure emerges
from Table 9—in cases of parallel litigation of the same patent(s) settlements in
Germany do not necessarily facilitate settlements in other jurisdictions (except,
perhaps in France). Thus, although the German system appears to be particularly
conducive to settlements, settlements are seldom achieved when the same patent
disputes are heard in front of other European courts, especially the UK and The
Netherlands. This may indicate the difficulties inherent in agreeing on settlement
while parallel litigation is ongoing—it may be the case that, given the variances in
outcomes of cases taken in Germany and the UK in particular, parties may persist
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in litigation at one venue even where they have settled the dispute elsewhere. The
centralised, unified enforcement promised by the UPC may, in such circum-
stances, lead to more unity of settlements across Europe—but probably only after
the transitional period of shared jurisdiction between national courts and the UPC
has ended.
Hence, in conclusion we observe a number of potential benefits of the UPC:
(i) the centralization of patent cases via the UPC will reduce differences in legal
procedures concerning patent enforcement across various European jurisdictions,
giving litigants greater legal clarity regarding procedures; (ii) the UPC may also
increase the speed of decision-making—for instance, our findings suggest that
only allowing for bifurcation under certain restrictive conditions (as envisaged
by the UPC Agreement) may increase the speed to reach a decision as well as
the share of invalidity claims that are decided by the court instead of settled;
(iii) the existence of UPC litigation will level the costs involved in patent
proceedings, which currently differ vastly across jurisdictions (moreover,
substantial costs may be accrued by enforcing or challenging the validity of
the same EP in multiple jurisdictions); (iv) the UPC will in the long term
eliminate the need for parallel litigation involving EPs and UPs—and thus, it
will help patentees and users of technology to avoid the legal and business
uncertainties that result from the existence of different outcomes of cases
concerning the same patent in different jurisdictions; and (v) the UPC may
therefore facilitate an increase in the unity of patent settlements across Europe,
cutting down on situations where a settlement is reached in one jurisdiction, but
litigation continues in the other(s).
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Table 13 FR
Year A B C D
All patent
cases
Only infringement and revocation Courts not
covereda
Cases counted once
per patentb
Infringement Revocation Sum
All EP All EP All EP All EP All EP All EP
2000 106 61 79 52 6 3 85 55 159 91.5 212 122
2001 126 58 89 47 8 6 97 53 189 87 252 116
2002 125 61 82 50 7 2 89 52 187.5 91.5 250 122
2003 85 43 57 36 3 2 60 38 127.5 64.5 170 86
2004 120 60 95 48 8 7 103 55 180 90 240 120
2005 118 87 80 78 8 3 88 81 177 130.5 236 174
2006 129 70 103 58 4 8 107 66 193.5 105 258 140
2007 106 64 81 51 12 9 93 60 159 96 212 128
2008 87 52 68 41 7 5 75 46 130.5 78 174 104
Sum 1002 556 734 461 63 45 797 506 1503 834 2004 1112
a Courts not covered by the survey include: Lyon, Rennes, Lille, Marseille, Bordeaux, Strasbourg,
Toulouse, Nancy, Limoges, Autres
b Number of cases multiplied by medium number of patents per case (2.00) over entire 2000–2008 period
Table 14 NL
Year A B D
All patent cases Only infringement and revocation Cases counted once per patenta
Infringement Revocation Sum All EP
All EP All EP All EP All EP
2000 42 28 36 24 3 3 39 27 56 38
2001 40 23 33 21 1 1 34 22 54 31
2002 31 22 29 20 1 1 30 21 42 30
2003 19 11 13 9 4 2 17 11 26 15
2004 45 28 33 23 8 3 41 26 61 38
2005 40 28 30 22 7 5 37 27 54 38
2006 35 18 34 17 1 1 35 18 47 24
2007 36 14 27 12 6 1 33 13 48 19
2008 38 26 24 19 9 3 33 22 51 35
Sum 326 198 259 167 40 20 299 187 438 266
a Number of cases multiplied by average number of patents per case (1.345) over entire 2000–2008
period
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